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Cutting the mists of the Black Mountain: 
cleavages in Montenegro’s divide over statehood and identity 
 
Abstract 
The two decades of Montenegro’s transition that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
were marked by the transformation of ambitions of the ruling political elites, which pushed 
the republic that once sought to be a member in a federal state towards independence. The 
shift  in the agendas of the political elites also caused the change in the meaning of the 
notions of ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’. Hence, this paper looks at cleavages that emerged 
during Montenegro’s divide over statehood and identity. It asserts that elite competition in 
unconsolidated states prompts the emergence of ethno-cultural cleavages, which are 
necessary for the establishment of identity of political elites and of their followers. The study 
first identifies the critical junctures for the emergence of functional and structural cleavages 
in Montenegro and associates these cleavages with the changing political context. It proceeds 
with the analysis of ethno-cultural cleavages, in arguing that these emerged from the 
politicisation of historical narratives. The study concludes by arguing that different types of 
cleavages supported the division over statehood and identity, and that due to the malleable 
identity in Montenegro, political reinforcement of overlapping cleavages was essential in 
order to cement ethno-cultural identities to the two camps. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, statehood and nationhood in Montenegro have been in 
flux. Since 1992, Montenegro has been a republic in the (FRY), a member state in Serbia and 
Montenegro (2002 – 2006), and an independent state (2006 – onwards). Equally, there has 
been a shift in people’s ethnic/national identification largely as a result of the association of 
the category ‘Montenegrin’ with independent statehood and of ‘Serb’ with the preservation of 
the common state with Serbia. These dynamics are reflected in the opposite referendum 
results in 1992 and 2006, as well as in the different census results in 1991 and 2003.  
On 1 March 1992, when the first referendum on the independence of Montenegro was 
held, 95.4% i of the people (66% turnout) opted for Montenegro to remain in a common state 
with other former Yugoslav republics wishing to do so (ICG 2000, 6). At the population 
census conducted a year before, 61.9% of the population defined themselves as 
Montenegrins, 9.4% as Serbs, while the remainder were of different minorities (FSO 1991). 
Considering that in 1991, ethnic minorities boycotted the referendum, the data indicate that 
the majority of the people in Montenegro at the time defined themselves as ‘Montenegrins’ 
and preferred a common state with Serbia to independence.  
The results of the second referendum on independence in Montenegro, held on 21 
May 2006, were different. Out of the 86.5% turnout, independent statehood was supported by 
55.5%, while the preservation of the union with Serbia was supported by 44.5% (CDT 2006). 
At the population census of 2003, 43.2% of people in Montenegro declared their national 
identity as ‘Montenegrin’, while 32% professed it as ‘Serb’ (Monstat 2003). Given that - as a 
result of their instrumentalisation in the pre-referendum years (Bieber 2003) - minorities 
supported independence in 2006, the above data indicate that the majority of the population 
who voted for the preservation of the common state defined themselves as ‘Serb’, and the 
lion’s share of the people who voted for independence identified themselves as 
‘Montenegrins’.  
As an epilogue to these swift changes of identity, the most recent population census 
indicates that the national/ethnic identification of the population has largely stabilised, 
although there is still some fluidity (Monstat 2011). In 2011, 28.7% and 45% of the 
population declared themselves as ‘Serb’ and ‘Montenegrin’, respectively (Monstat 2011). 
Hence this paper explores how the ethnic/national identification changed as a result of the 
deep structural conflict that emerged in the fifteen years of Montenegro’s transition and how 
this conflict was channelled both into the political arena and into societal life.  
The transfer of conflict into politics took place in 1997. The ruling Democratic Party 
of Socialists (DPS), the heir of the Communist Party, split into two factions that quickly 
bifurcated the republic’s political scene. While the DPS remained the dominant political actor 
in Montenegro, the opposition was formed through the coagulation of political forces around 
the Socialist People’s Party (SNP). Initially, the conflict revolved over the support to or 
opposition of Milošević’s regime, embraced by the SNP and the DPS respectively. Yet, with 
the demise of Milošević in 2000, the changing agendas of the political players offset the 
divide over statehood and identity in Montenegro. Gradually, the DPS became the proponent 
of Montenegrin independence and a separate Montenegrin ethnic identity, while the SNP 
promoted the common state with Serbia and a Montenegrin ethnic identity indistinct from the 
Serb one.  
 In examining this translation of conflict into politics, the paper focuses on cleavages 
that emerged during Montenegro’s divide over statehood and identity. It views cleavages in a 
Rokkanian fashion, which explains the formation of first political parties in Western Europe 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1997, Rokkan 1970, Rokkan 1999). Hence, cleavages are representations 
of conflict and divisions in democratic societies, which emerge as an outcome of structural 
processes, such as modernisation, national awakening, or state building. Yet, cleavages 
‘freeze’ conflict in major transformative moments for a polity - critical junctures (Mair 2001). 
As such, cleavages are equally applicable to post-communist societies, which underwent 
comprehensive structural transformations after 1989. According to Martin (2000), cleavages 
are mobilised by political actors so that they can perpetuate political divides and crystallize 
the party structure of the state, thus establishing clear voter alignments. This 
institutionalisation of divisions into durable political action is possible because cleavages 
contain either social elements, such as class, or identitiarian aspects, such as gender, race, and 
other (Bartolini 2005).  
Building on the Rokkanian notion of the cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1997, Rokkan 
1970, Rokkan 1999), this paper fosters the broader argument that in transitional societies in 
which the processes of state and nation building are at the core of political activity, cleavages 
related to ethnic/national identity become politicised. As such, they prove to be quintessential 
for the establishment of the identity of both political elites and of their followers. This is so 
because elite competition for power gains salience in societies facing recovery from a 
negative transitionii. If such societies have suffered from previous divides (e.g. religious, 
tribal, class, ethnic) as has been the case with Montenegro, these divides emerge as cleavages 
in the new elite competition. 
In constructing this argument, the study first identifies the critical junctures in the 
divide over statehood and identity in Montenegro, which are essential for understanding the 
emergence of different cleavages in the twenty years of Montenegro’s transition. The paper 
maintains that the 1989 ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolutions and the 2000 fall of Milošević were 
the critical junctures in which different structural (ethnic) cleavages were dominant, while the 
1997 split of the DPS and 2006 Montenegro’s independence brought about the prevalence of 
functional (class, operational) cleavages. Second, the paper argues that Montenegrin political 
elites revived ethno-cultural narratives in order to ensure the prevalence of structural over 
functional cleavages, thus proving that cleavages in unconsolidated states are malleable. The 
study concludes by relating the different types of cleavages (overlapping, cross-cutting, 
independent) to the development of the political landscape in Montenegro.  
 
2. Critical junctures in the divide over statehood and identity 
 
In the recent political history of Montenegro, four critical junctures can be identified - the 
1989 ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolutions (ABR); the 1997 split of the DPS; the 2000 fall of 
Milošević; and the 2006 independence of Montenegro. Each of these major events ‘froze’ an 
existing societal divide and reproduced it within the polity’s institutional setup as ethno-
cultural (structural) and/or political (functional) cleavage. Yet, the nature of political 
divisions in Montenegro has led to an overlap between these two types of cleavages thus 
making them complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. In other words, although either 
structural or functional cleavages were dominant at all four critical junctures, both types of 
cleavages played a role in reproducing the political struggles in Montenegro. 
The replacement of one set of communist elites with the ostensibly reformist 
leadership at the time of the ABR, and their affiliation with Milošević’s policies, ensured the 
continuation of the rule Communist Party in Montenegro at the time of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The dominance of the communist heirs, which embraced Serb 
nationalist rhetoric, transferred the ethno-religious cleavages into politics. Parties with ethnic 
prefixes emerged, and religion became the key determinant of ethnic identity and political 
behaviour. At the second critical juncture, the split of the DPS in 1997, societal division that 
was captured into cleavages was the one over the support of or opposition to Milošević. 
Structural ethnic cleavages created at the time of the ABR continued to exist, but were 
overshadowed by new divisions. The third critical juncture in Montenegrin politics, and the 
only one that was triggered externally - by the fall of Milošević in 2000 - caused the 
recalibration of goals of the Montenegrin political elites, which aligned into pro-
independence/pro-Montenegrin and unionist/pro-Serb camps. Hence in addition to the 
already existing functional cleavages established at the previous critical juncture, new ethnic 
cleavages that differentiated Montenegrin and Serb identity resurfaced amidst struggles for 
political power. The final critical juncture in recent Montenegrin politics was the 2006 
independence, which offset another reconfiguration of the country’s political scene. 
Cleavages that were created previously were adjoined by new functional (socio-economic) 
divisions, particular with the former unionist camp that needed to adapt to the new 
circumstances after the resolution of the statehood issue.  
In sum, the critical junctures of 1989 and 2000 were characterised by the dominance 
of two different structural (ethnic) cleavages, parts of which are still alive in the country’s 
politics. The ones of 1997 and 2006 gave rise to mostly functional (class, operational) 
cleavages as they were marked with the prevalence of socio-economic concerns over 
nationalist rhetoric and practice. Yet a full understanding of the interplay of these cleavages 
is necessary for the analysis of Montenegro’s divide over statehood and identity.  
 
2.1. Dominance of structural cleavages at critical junctures 
 
The emergence of structural cleavages at critical junctures is often supported by an active 
national movement, which underpinned the events that marked that juncture. In the case of 
Montenegro, the first structural cleavages appeared in the late 1980s. The ‘anti-bureaucratic’ 
revolution, which gave rise to Slobodan Milošević’s in power in Serbia, also produced a set 
of ‘reformed’ communist elites in Montenegro, led by Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović. 
The new Montenegrin elites remained loyal to Milošević’s nationalist politics, which created 
social and political divisions, as will be elaborated below. 
Historically, ethnic/national identity in Montenegro has been dual, which has been 
entrenched in the notion of the ‘national homo duplex’ (Darmanović 1992, 28). That is, the 
categories ‘Serb’ and ‘Montenegrin’ were not mutually exclusive and many of the people of 
Christian Orthodox faith associated themselves with both identities. This historical duality 
emerged during the rule of the Petrović dynasty, when Montenegro’s prince-bishops used 
both terms to refer to their population (Roberts 2007). A form of the divide between the 
‘Serb’ and ‘Montenegrin’ ethnic/national identity in Montenegro emerged in the period 
immediately preceding the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and was 
related to the question of Montenegrin status in the new state. In 1917-18 Montenegro 
became an ideological and political battlefield between the proponents of unconditional 
unification with Serbia under the Karađorđević dynasty - the Whites - and the proponents of a 
union of equal members - the Greens (Rastoder 2003, p. 131). This dichotomy persisted 
throughout the following decades, until it became entrenched within the federal structures of 
the socialist Yugoslavia.  
 The Yugoslav constitutional establishment considered republics as ‘states although 
self-determination was limited by the federal constitution, phrased in such a way as to make it 
appear that the right had already been exercised’ (Shoup 1968, p.115). The decentralised 
Yugoslav model allowed for the flourishing of separate identities in the republics, but 
proclamations of extreme nationalism were sanctioned in order to avoid the interwar and 
World War II Yugoslav experience (see: Hodson, Sekulić and Massey 1994).  Nevertheless, 
during the socialist period, identity in Montenegro was far from consolidated. In fact, the 
political decision to grant Montenegro the status of a republic in 1946 was aimed at placating 
the differences that existed among the population in the interwar period, and at dampening 
the divide between Whites and Greens. A high ranking communist official at the time - 
Milovan Đilas - claimed that Montenegrins were a part of a larger corpus of Serbs, and that 
their history of statehood made them ‘the best of Serbs’ (Đilas 1947, pp. 3-4). According to 
Đilas, it was the status of a separate republic that should be granted to Montenegro, but not 
the status of a separate nation (Đilas 1947, p. 5). Hence, during the socialist period, there 
were not many explicit manifestations of a distinct Montenegrin identity - and if there were 
any, they were considered retrograde - prompting a general consensus among the people that 
Montenegrins were indistinct from Serbs (Pavlović 2002, p. 139). These dynamics reinforced 
the ‘national homo duplex’ in Montenegro (Darmanović 1992, 28). 
 Yet, the collapse of communism moved the ‘Montenegrin pendulum from one nexus 
of power to another’ (Radonjić 1998, 25).  Due to the influence of the media, church and 
politics, Montenegrin politics developed predominantly under the umbrella of Serbian 
nationalism. The galvanisation of the people into a movement based on Serbian nationalism is 
largely attributable to the conundrum surrounding identity in Montenegro described above. 
The fact that the elites in the first half of the 1990s did not emphasise the difference between 
the two counterparts of Montenegrin identity helped preserve the populist movement driven 
by Serbian nationalism.  
At the time of the economic embargo and isolationist policies of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, ideas of political populism and extreme (Serbian) nationalism resonated well 
with the people. In the parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1992, the DPS acquired control of 
the absolute majority of seats in the Parliament of Montenegro. Since political pluralism in 
the republic was still nascent at this time, the former communists had sufficient margin to 
control most of the Montenegrin institutions. However, the doctrine of communism was no 
longer the main pillar of the party. Rather, the DPS was a conglomerate of politically 
heterogeneous elements, held together by a common interest: political survival. At the time of 
uncertainty caused by the fall of communism and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the 
DPS’s political survival was possible only by the upholding of ethno-religious cleavages that 
emerged across the region.  
Cleavages thus created continued to reproduce themselves on the Montenegrin 
political scene in the following years. According to Darmanović (1992, 28), ‘society was 
constantly diverted from the important political issues the party wasn’t able to solve, and at 
the same time homogenised through the incessant production of enemies both without 
(Croatian, Slovenian) and within (Muslims, Albanian, ‘Montenegrin secessionists’)’. In the 
Montenegrin political context, a stark difference emerged among the ruling DPS, which 
attracted predominantly the Christian-Orthodox majority, and the parties of ethno-religious 
minorities, such as Albanians, Bosniaks, and Muslims. In addition to these, two further 
parties emphasising predominantly structural cleavages appeared in the republic. The Liberal 
Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG), a Montenegrin nationalist Movement, and the People’s 
Party (NS), which emphasised the Serbian origins of Montenegrins, represented political 
players which indicated the existence of the rift among the majority population as well. 
However, due to the mesmerisation of the majority population by Serbian nationalism in the 
early 1990s, this cleavage remained subdued until the dominant political players changed 
their nationalist rhetoric.  
The end of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia appeased the overall political context in 
Montenegro, thus decreasing the level of Serb nationalism among the political elites in 
general. As a consequence, the critical juncture represented by the split of the DPS in 1997, 
yielded predominantly functional cleavages based on support of and opposition to 
Milošević.iii  Yet, structural cleavages re-emerged following the change of regime in 
Belgrade in October 2000. The two camps, which previously defined themselves through 
their relationship to the regime in Belgrade, became deprived of their primary meaning. The 
new political reality required the reinvention of political agendas. Đukanović’s DPS acquired 
the role of the bearer of the idea of Montenegrin independent statehood. By contrast, 
Bulatović’s SNP came to epitomise the preservation of the common state with Serbia. 
Consequently, as the identities of the two political camps evolved, these two wings of the 
former communists generated two poles for national identification of the Montenegrin 
population. At the end of the last millennium, Đukanović’s DPS stood for the pro-
independence idea and a separate Montenegrin national identity. The competing SNP 
corresponded to the unionist aspirations, and the emphasis on the Serbian origins of 
Montenegrins. 
The consequence of this bifurcation of Montenegrin politics was the exacerbation of 
the structural cleavage among the majority population: that is, the differentiation between 
Serbs and Montenegrins, which arose out of people’s affiliation with unionist or pro-
independence movements. This is illustrated in Table 1 (below), which presents an overview 
of the first parliamentary elections after the ouster of Milošević. 
[Table 1 near here] 
If the Montenegrin parliamentary elections of 2001, illustrated above, are taken as the 
indicators of the translation of the societal division, it is notable that only a 0.37% of the 
electorate remained neutral in the divide (CDT 2001; CDT 2002). Political players supported 
by that electorate were shaped by functional cleavages. An example of that were parties 
concerned with the negative effects of transition, such as the loss of savings due to pyramidal 
schemes in the early 1990s. The remaining parties revolved around two centres with a 
slightly greater support for the independence than for the unionist cause, which is a further 
proof of the dominance of the structural cleavages between the two camps after the ouster of 
Milošević.  
 
2.2. Dominance of functional cleavages at critical junctures 
 
When concerns other than the competition between ethno-culturally diverse groups prevail in 
a society, functional cleavages emerge at critical junctures. This, however, does not imply 
that they triumph over the existing structural cleavages. Rather, they complement them, and 
temporarily change the dynamics of inter-group competition in the polity, as was the case in 
Montenegro in 1997 and 2006.   
 The creation of two factions within the DPS in 1997 triggered the reorganisation of 
Montenegrin party politics. This occurred through the rapprochement of Đukanović’s wing of 
the DPS with the anti-Milošević, yet pro-Serb, People’s Party (NS), the parties of ethno-
cultural minorities, such as Bosniaks and Albanians, and the multiethnic Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). Thus, the mediation of the ethno-cultural cleavage is apparent in the way 
Đukanović’s camp was established. Đukanović’s DPS at the time hardly mentioned any 
reference to national identity in Montenegro, while the remaining parties that coagulated 
around the DPS had very diversified agendas. The SNP, which became the major opposition 
player retained some of the DPS’s nationalist rhetoric from the early 1990s, which is 
attributable to its continued association with Milošević. Still, according to its founder, Momir 
Bulatović (2005), the party was also significantly driven by a functional cleavage, i.e., it 
emphasised the corrupt nature of Đukanović’s DPS, and the illegal enrichment of the elites at 
the time of the international embargo in the early 1990s.  
The rift in Montenegrin politics created at this critical juncture was revealed on two 
occasions – the 1997 Presidential Elections and the 1998 Parliamentary Elections. Both 
elections ended up with extremely close results for the two factions of the former DPS. This 
reinforces the argument that two poles of critical mass were formed either in opposition to or 
in favour of Milošević’s politics. This is illustrated in Table 2 (below), which presents an 
overview of parties and their affiliation in the 1998 Parliamentary Elections. 
[Table 2 near here] 
The dominance of functional cleavages at these elections is supported by the fact that the 
question of Montenegrin independence was not the main point on the political agenda of 
either political bloc. Rather, it was the issue of support for or opposition to Milošević, and the 
future of political and economic reforms in Montenegro and in Yugoslavia. The degree of 
polarisation is reflected in the election results, which reveal that a very small percentage of 
the political spectrum in Montenegro (0.4% of the electorate) was neutral in the division. 
Kubo and Strmiska claim that this division was not based on the national sentiments of the 
population. They uphold this argument by looking at the 1991 census data, and by noticing 
the minimal support for the parties with ‘ethnic prefixes’ (Kubo 2008; Strmiska 2005). 
Hence, ethno-cultural cleavages were not captured and transplanted into party politics at the  
critical juncture in 1997. 
Following the split in the DPS, the Montenegrin political scene remained polarised. 
Notwithstanding, the shaping of the republic’s political milieu was not finalised in 1997. 
Instead, the profiles of the political parties changed shape in the following years. This process 
took place in an environment created by the rupture in the DPS, Đukanović’s detachment 
from Milošević, and the subsequent creation of the two opposed political blocs. By 
countering Milošević’s policies from 1997 to 2000, the Montenegrin leadership embarked on 
a course of ‘creeping independence’. The by-product of such a policy - which entailed the 
detachment from the federal institutions – was that the DPS gradually transformed its 
opposition to the regime in Belgrade into a quest for statehood (van Meurs 2002). This 
affected the nature of the 2000 critical juncture,iv after which the structural cleavages 
prevailed over the functional ones until the resolution of the status question in the 2006 
referendum on independence.  
The referendum was the most recent critical juncture for the Montenegrin party 
politics and it sparked the recalibration of the political scene. The DPS remained the major 
political player, having claimed the victory at the referendum. However, prior to the elections 
in September 2006, the former unionists split into three factions of approximately equal size. 
The SNP - the pillar of the former unionist bloc - was the first party to show a willingness to 
change its political program and abandon its nationalist rhetoric. This change was generated 
immediately after the publication of the referendum results, and was manifested through 
attempts to balance the loss at the plebiscite with the preservation of SNP’s electorate. The 
continuing discord was mostly displayed by the SNS, which became the party representative 
of the Serbs in Montenegro. The SNS called for the formation of the ‘Serbian List’ coalition. 
However, this call did not resonate well with the rest of the opposition bloc, since the SNP 
rejected the proposal as it considered itself a ‘civic’ party.  Moreover, new political forces 
entered the scene, the most notable example being the Movement for Change (PzP). The PzP 
grew out of an NGO focused on reforms and the development of economic policies different 
from the ones proposed by the government. Therefore, after the 2006 critical juncture new 
functional cleavages emerged and changed the dynamics of political struggles in Montenegro. 
  
3. Political agents and the rise of cleavages through ethno-cultural narratives 
 
As cleavages are representations of conflict in a society, looking at the way they are related to 
one another helps us to understand the political dynamics in that society. Cleavages that 
emerge as a result of divisions in a polity can be independent, overlapping, or cross-cutting in 
relation to each other. If cleavages are independent, they are unrelated to other cleavages that 
have been created. For instance, in Albania the population is either Christian (Orthodox or 
Catholic), or Muslim. Although there are other cleavages in the country (e.g., class), the 
religious cleavage is largely unrelated to it and thus independent. If cleavages are 
overlapping, they reinforce one another and thus create deeper societal divisions and sharper 
distinctions among the population. Such is the case with Northern Ireland, whereby the 
religious cleavage overlaps with the economic one, thus emphasising the distinction between 
nationalists and unionists. If a cleavage is cross-cutting, they are divisive but not as clear cut 
as they can be associated with multiple groups. As such, these cleavages are often reinforced 
by other overlapping cleavages in societies with manifest ethno-cultural plurality. 
Switzerland is an example of a society in which the linguistic cleavage is supplemented by 
the religious one, as to perpetuate the specificities of the different ethnic groups. In such 
cases, more often than not, the overlapping cleavage will have a manifest dominance in 
shaping the group, because it will make a clear distinction between communities.  
In the case of Montenegro, some of these cleavages already existed, and were simply 
reinforced. Only after the political actors triggered the overlapping structural (ethno-cultural) 
cleavages did the manifest divisions among the people become apparent. The revival of 
ethno-cultural narratives that would make a clear distinction between Serb and Montenegrin 
identities helped the two camps to shape their political identities. In the early 1990s, neither 
the religious, nor cultural, nor symbolic cleavages were markers that would distinguish 
‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’ aspects of identity in Montenegro. For this reason, and in contrast 
to other successor states of the former Yugoslavia, identity in Montenegro was dual.v That is, 
a number of people felt ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’ at the same time. The divide over statehood 
in Montenegro eventually led to the reconstruction of ‘Montenegrin’ and ‘Serb’ identities and 
their association to pro-independence and unionist camps, respectively.  
3.1. Religion: an ethno-cultural cleavage or a political epiphenomenon? 
After the fall of the socialist regime, there was a reawakening of religious beliefs among the 
people of Eastern Europe. Some academics explain that phenomenon by focusing on the 
revival of religion (suppressed during the communist era) as a pillar of new identities across 
the region (Krastev and Mungiu-Pippidi 2004, 10-25). The decades of socialist rule created 
strong attachments to the concept of the ‘group’/’class’. Once socialism no longer exercised 
influence, people needed a substitute for it in order to recreate the nature of their group 
attachment, which could no longer be represented by ‘class’. Individuality could not be 
regenerated per se, owing to the societal instability caused by the fall of the old system. Thus, 
reverting to religion served as one of the tools that assisted the ‘re-imagination’ of the 
identities of the newly formed states. Such was the case with the other republics in the former 
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in Montenegro the religious cleavage was not initially the source 
of differentiation among the Christian Orthodox population. Until 2000, Orthodox 
Christianity was a means of differentiating the majority population in Montenegro from 
Albanian, Bosniak, Croat and Muslim minorities. After the bifurcation of the Montenegrin 
political scene into pro-independence/pro-Montenegrin and unionist/pro-Serb camps, the 
association with (predominantly) the Serbian (SPC) or (somewhat) the Montenegrin (CPC) 
Orthodox Church became a politicised ethno-cultural cleavage. However, the DPS elite also 
sought to attract non-Christian Orthodox minorities to their cause and thus was very careful 
over the question of religion (Morrison 2009, 47). Due to this ambiguity over the position of 
the CPC among the DPS, the religious cleavage only reinforced the existing narratives when 
overlapping with other cleavages. In other words, the religious cleavage was never as 
dominant in Montenegro as it has been, for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the 
association with church as an epi-political institution and not pure religious belief became a 
layer of identity. 
The CPC as it is today, appeared in the early 1990s and claimed its historical 
existence in Montenegro until the unification of Yugoslavia in 1918, when it was subsumed 
by the SPC (see Morisson 2009; Ramet 2010). Initially, the CPC was not recognised by the 
authorities of the state, who throughout most of the 1990s, supported the SPC (Pobjeda 06 
January 1995, 2). Only when the identity of his camp was established as pro-independence 
did Đukanović acknowledge – yet not openly support - the existence of the CPC. The likely 
reasons for this were that 1) most of the DPS supporters identified with SPC throughout the 
1990s; and that 2) most of the historical religious buildings were owned by the SPC, which 
facilitated the identification of people with that church. 
The complex relationship between the two churches - and their affiliation with the 
Montenegrin authorities - has roots in different interpretations of Montenegrin identity. The 
Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church claimed that ‘Montenegrin identity is a 
historical fiction. Serbs and Montenegrins are the same people, the same nation’ (Santoro 
1999a, 8). The attitude of the SPC resonated strongly with the members of the opposition 
block who, according to the polls, identified primarily with this church, implying that the 
Metropolitan Amfilohije was the person of greatest confidence in Montenegro (CEDEM 
2005). Research further points to the importance of religion among the supporters of the pro-
union bloc, who perceived the divide in Montenegro primarily as a rift in the Orthodox 
population (‘pravoslavni živalj’). Consequently, for the unionist/pro-Serbian opposition, the 
emphasis on Orthodox Christianity was an important marker of identity. It helped create the 
image of ethnic identity firmly rooted in the religious cleavage. 
The opposite was only partly true for the members of the pro-independence/pro-
Montenegrin camp as the position of the CPC is controversial in the DPS and among its 
supporters. As a consequence, the religious cleavage in this political camp was not 
emphasised to the same extent as among the opposition members. The supporters of the DPS, 
which advocated independent statehood in the 2006 Montenegrin referendum, often 
identified themselves with the SPC rather than the CPC. The CPC was endorsed by minor 
parties promoting the independence of Montenegro, such as the SDP and LSCG. Thus, 
religion had a largely political connotation for the pro-independence camp. As a political 
epiphenomenon, the CPC challenged the religious dominion of the SPC. The CPC provided a 
point of reference for those people in the pro-independence camp who cherished religion as a 
part of their identity, but did not wish to be identified with a church that had a prefix ‘Serb’ in 
its name. Moreover, given the fact that the orthodox Christianity does not have a centralised, 
but a national church system, for some members of the pro-independence camp, the existence 
of CPC legitimised the separateness of Montenegrin identity and the quest for statehood. As a 
consequence, ‘the struggle for the church [became] essentially the struggle for statehood’ 
(Santoro 1999a, 8). Religion thus proved to be a political, rather than an ethno-cultural 
cleavage in the struggle over statehood and identity in Montenegro. 
3.2. Revival of tribalism as an ethno-cultural cleavage 
In Montenegrin society, the concept of the tribe is historically grounded in the collective 
memory, as a ‘military, political and moral collective’ that controlled its members (Jovanović 
1995, 65; Boehm 1983). However, the revival of a new form of tribal structures also became 
an ethno-cultural cleavage in the battle over statehood and identity. Through the ascription of 
individuals to a particular tribe, and tribes to a particular political movement, the history and 
tradition of Montenegro became tools through which a political idea reached the population. 
Throughout history tribes never went to war against each other for ideological or political 
reasons, and although ‘tribes changed with history, they always bore the responsibility for 
government in a unified Montenegro’ (Calhoun 1993, 38).  
In the context of the divide over statehood and identity, tribes became reinvented as an 
emblem of folk culture, so as to generate a feeling of national belonging. However, within a 
different socio-political context, this historical symbol gained a completely different 
meaning. According to Popović (2002, 23), the revival of tribal structures in Montenegrin 
society was a means for Milošević’s followers to ‘build some new, alternative, however false, 
source of legitimacy’ after their political defeats in the previous years. Against such a view, 
the unionist camp maintained that during 1999 and 2000, the gatherings – sports 
competitions, political discussions, poetry evenings - were the assemblies aimed at 
revitalising this camp’s political strength (Pobjeda October-November 1999). They were 
attended the most in the northern part of Montenegro, where the support for the pro-union 
bloc was dominant.  
These gatherings resulted in the formation of the Council of People’s Assemblies, the 
pillar association of these tribes. It bore the name reminiscent of historical gatherings of tribal 
chieftains during the dynastic rule. Such a reproduction of history was criticised by the 
government for the distortion of history and its utilisation for the achievement of political 
aims (Šuković 1999, 1). In addition, these gatherings also provoked the reinvention of pro-
Montenegrin neo-tribes as a counterweight to the supporters of the Yugoslav idea. These new 
tribes - associated with the idea of independent Montenegrin statehood - were located 
southwest of the Zeta River. Unlike their northern counterparts, united under a pillar 
association with a clear political purpose, the congregations of the southern tribes usually 
took the shape of more informal folklore or sports gatherings.  
As maintained by Calhoun (1993, 5), these differences marked a rift between the Old 
Montenegrin tribes and the Brda tribes, giving the struggle over statehood and identity a 
geographical dimension. This division was important, since the Brda tribes were incorporated 
into Montenegro only in the nineteenth and twentieth century, by the acquisition of territory 
following the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, in light of the new political 
struggles, the Brda tribes associated themselves with unionist ideas and professed the idea of 
the Serbian origins of Montenegrins. This process was facilitated by: a) these tribes’ 
geographical proximity to Serbia; and b) the emphasis - in the politicians’ discourse - on 
these tribes’ traditional ties with Serbia (Simić 1997, 124-131). Thus tribalism, as a 
politically driven ethno-cultural cleavage, helped to create new imagined lines of division 
such as regional differences between the North and South in Montenegro. 
3.3. The divisive function of symbols  
The ‘implicit meanings’ of the symbols of the state, such as the flag, the coat of arms, or the 
national anthem, have often been connected to the people’s histories (Douglas 1975, 14). 
According to Andrijašević (2004, 28), ‘history, as an important element of identity of a 
community, offsets the action, gives an example, strengthens hopes and reminds of a grand 
goal that needs to be achieved’. Accordingly, symbols proved to be an important, politically 
generated, ethno-cultural cleavage in the polemic surrounding statehood and identity in 
Montenegro. Both camps reinterpreted history in order to give legitimacy to their claims in 
the eyes of the public. After 2000, the pro-independence interpretation of tradition distanced 
Montenegro from Serbia and the common state with it. The opposition camp challenged this 
view and tried to preserve the old symbols and their meaning, seeking to remain in the 
common state with Serbia. Since both claims were to a certain extent historically justified, the 
state symbols of Montenegro all became a central part of the debate on statehood and 
identity. In particular, the ruling DPS ‘utilised emotive rhetoric intended to appeal to the 
romantic inclinations of the Montenegrin people, […]as a brave, honourable, and independent 
people. Contemporary Montenegrins, they argued, were presented with a unique historical 
mission – to correct the grievances felt by their forefathers who had to bear the loss of 
Montenegrin independence in 1918’ (Morrison 2009a, 46).  
 The present Montenegrin state symbols still prove to be controversial, and a source of 
on-going political divisions (Milošević 2012, web). Having been adopted at the time of the 
divide over statehood and identity by the ruling DPS-led camp, they bear references to the 
independent Principality and later Kingdom of Montenegro, and thus to the Montenegrin 
state tradition. This ‘rather romanticised reworking of history blended with contemporary 
arguments’ (Morrison 2009a, 46) reinforced the ruling elite’s rhetoric on the need of an 
independent Montenegro as the continuation of the long tradition of statehood prior to 1918. 
Hence, the politicisation of symbols as an ethno-cultural cleavage was very much 
rooted in the debates over their historical meaning and connotations. In fact, at the the peak of 
the divide, the pro-independence/pro-Montenegrin government adopted a new Law on State 
Symbols in 2004, which redefined the coat of arms and the flag of Montenegro. The Law 
described the coat of arms of Montenegro as ‘a golden crowned double-headed eagle with it 
wings in flight, with a sceptre in its right and an orb in its left claw on a red base. On the 
eagle's chest is a shield with a golden lion passant’ (art.4). Following Article 5 of the Law, 
the flag of Montenegro was red, bordered in gold, and with the coat of arms in the middle. 
The unionists claimed that a departure from history had been made, since the traditional 
Montenegrin flag used to be red, blue and white (as the Serbian one), with a white eagle 
(similar to the Serbian coat of arms) (Đurković 2007, 6). However, an examination of the 
Montenegrin flags and coats of arms indicates that the new Montenegrin flag is a 
combination of the background of the dynastic army flag (red background with a golden 
border), the coat of arms of the Principality of Montenegro prior to the arrival of King Nikola 
(white eagle) and the colour of the eagle from King Nikola’s flag. Actually, the army flag of 
King Nicholas did not have a golden border, and although the eagle was – unlike in the 
previous Montenegrin flags – golden, it did not have a lion on its chest, but the symbols of 
the ruler (Andrijašević 1998, 51). This implies that the state symbols became an important 
element of romanticising the image of the nation by the DPS-led camp, and that the conflict 
over their meaning still perpetuates as an ethno-cultural cleavage in the Montenegrin society. 
Similar was the controversy over the national anthem, whereby the government 
tended to eliminate all reference to what may have been interpreted as a Serbian aspect of 
Montenegrin identity. In 2004, the text of the national anthem ‘Oj svijetla majska zoro’ (‘Oh, 
the bright dawn of May’) has been adopted by the ruling elite. The controversial text of the 
anthem has, similar to the state symbols been created out of several historical texts. A portion 
of the anthem’s text existed in the folk tradition of Montenegro, and it was reworked in 1932 
by Sekula Drljević, the interwar leader of the Montenegrin federalists who later collaborated 
with the Italians closely allied with the Croatian ustaša movement (see: Pajović 1977 ,70-75). 
While the meaning of the anthem has never been contested in the political discourse, the fact 
that two of its verses have been written by Drljević is still controversial. By using Drljević’s 
version of the text, the DPS leaders sought to reinforce the idea of Montenegro’s statehood 
tradition and the struggle for it, as the interwar federalist movement largely carried nationalist 
elements. However, the association of the federalists with fascism proved controversial not 
only between the two blocs, but also within the DPS itself. This has been emphasised in the 
recent statement by the Montenegrin President – Filip Vujanović, who noted 
I have no objection regarding the content of the two verses. On the contrary, I respect the content of 
those verses, and I am absolutely convinced that the final message is an excellent one : ‘So may 
Montenegro live forever!’, and I think that our anthem should end by that message. That what is 
impossible to relate to the antifascist Montenegro is the authorship o those two verses. It is beyond any 
doubt that the authorship of those verses belongs to man who does not belong to the anti-fascist 
movement in Montenegro, but who rather represents the negation of anti-fascism in Montenegro 
(Vujanović in CDM, 30/09/2011, web). 
In this context, the discord over symbols in Montenegro points to the importance of 
history for the imagination of the nation. It also indicates how political elites can use those 
symbols and make them widely available to the public, yet wrapped up in their own agendas. 
Once such divisive symbols become a part of the polity’s living reality, they bear in 
themselves a part of the political conflict and transform into another politically malleable 
ethno-cultural cleavage.  
3.4. Language as an ethno-cultural cleavage 
The question of language is inextricably related to the education system, the press, and the 
general transmission of ideas, as noted by most of the academic work on nationalism and 
identity (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Gellner 1990; B. Anderson 1990). In the Balkans, 
ever since the romantic ideas of the unification of the South Slavs in the mid nineteenth 
century, language was an important aspect of how people viewed themselves (White 2000). 
As a consequence of the events in the region in the 1990s, language developed a political 
aspect and became related to territory, i.e., to the ‘political organisation of space’(White 
2000, 181).  
According to Article 9 of the 1992 Constitution, the ‘language in official use’ in 
Montenegro was the ijekavski dialect of Serbian. Prior to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
the language was termed as Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian. After the break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia, the successor states enshrined separate languages in their constitutional 
frameworks, named after the state or having reference to it (Radojević 1989, 7). In the FRY, 
and in Montenegro, the official language remained Serbian, which has been changed after 
Montenegro became an independent state. The constitutional provisions related to language 
are a further indication of the politicisation of a cleavage, which reinforced the ethno-cultural 
narrative of the ruling elite. 
In Article 13, the Constitution of Montenegro of 2007 stipulates that the ‘official 
language in Montenegro is Montenegrin’, while ‘Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian and Croatian’ 
are ‘officially used languages’. During the constitutional debate, the denomination of 
language as Montenegrin faced fierce opposition by the former unionist bloc, which deemed 
it a political move (Antović in Pobjeda 20/6/2006). The unionist bloc supported the 
preservation of the name of the official language as Serbian, arguing that, in line with the 
2003 population census (Monstat 2003), 59.7 % of the people spoke the Serbian language, 
while 21.5 % spoke Montenegrin. 
At the same time, for the former pro-independence camp terming the language as 
Montenegrin gave legal guarantees to the political prevalence of their concept of identity 
based on historical grievances. The revival of the discourse over the Montenegrin language 
has been reinforced by the activities of the pro-independence cultural organisations, such as 
the Montenegrin PEN centre, and in the writings of the linguists Vojislav Nikčević and 
Borislav Jovanović. In the context of historical grievances, Jovanović (2005, 10) claimed that 
‘the Montenegrin language is still saw as linguistically deviant – as a variant, sub-variant, 
Montenegrism – in line with the unitary and assimilationist philological conceptions. 
However, despite this suppression, the Montenegrin language is not a dead language’. 
In addition to denominating the language as ‘Montenegrin’, in July 2009, the Ministry 
of Education of Montenegro adopted the new orthographic norms, according to which 
Montenegrin alphabet no longer has 30 graphemes, but 32 (ś and ź have been added). 
Montenegro is the only former Yugoslav successor state that has changed the alphabet, which 
is another indicator of the politicisation of language which thus became a structural cleavage. 
The divisiveness of language has also been manifest in the 2011 population census (Monstat 
2011), whereby 39.8%, of the population declared Montenegrin to be its native tongue, 
against 42.9 % speakers of Serbian. Having in mind that 45% of Montenegro’s population 
declared themselves as Montenegrin and 28.7% as Serb in 2011, and the above-presented 
2003 census results on language, there is an indication that the overlap between language and 
ethnic/national identity is still fluid. However, the process is largely unfinished, which points 
to the fact that the linguistic cleavage displays its ethno-cultural nature once politicised and 
adjoined to other structural cleavages. 
4. Structuration and the typology of cleavages 
In unconsolidated political contexts cleavages are particularly susceptible to manipulation by 
political actors. At the time of the divide over statehood and identity, Montenegrin political 
elites revived ethno-cultural narrativesvi and triggered the dominance of structural cleavages 
over the functional ones. In fact, in the late 1990s Montenegro was a society that was 
recovering from the effects of a negative transition, triggered by instability that followed the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia (Popović 2002). As a consequence of a series of political 
processes, Montenegro’s political scene became highly polarised as of 1997, and elite 
competition for power became salient. Given the dynamics of elite competition, and the 
change in the structure of opportunities and constraints generated by Milošević’s departure 
from power, the politicization of cleavages became imminent in attracting the electorate to 
the two camps. Montenegrin society had historically suffered from previous divides (e.g. 
religious, tribal, class, ethnic), and having left enough historical uncertainty as to the lines of 
this divide (Roberts 2007), they re-emerged as cleavages in the new elite competition. 
Consequently, old divides became politicised and transformed into ethno-cultural cleavages. 
As such, they became quintessential for the establishment of the identity of both the 
leadership and the supporters of the pro-independence/pro-Montenegrin and unionist/pro-
Serb camps.  
The overlapping cleavages that marked Montenegro’s divide over statehood and identity 
helped the cementing of the ideas of ethno-cultural particularity of Serbs and Montenegrins to 
the unionist and the pro-independence camps, respectively. That is, the more overlapping 
cleavages were revived, the more was it possible to coagulate them around one political 
representation of identity. Thus, the fact that the two competing camps associated religion, 
with ethnic and tribal belonging, meant that the political competition occurred between two 
players and that these cleavages did not allow for the emergence of further competitors for 
power. In the case of Montenegro, this is illustrated by those people who felt Montenegrin, 
associated with the idea of independence, neo-Montenegrin tribes, and the CPC; and by those 
people who felt Serb, associated with the idea of the preservation of the common state, pro-
Serbian tribes, and the SPC. Hence, the divide between the two camps in Montenegro cut 
deep into society, because overlapping cleavages tend to reinforce the perceptions of identity. 
Yet, the overlapping cleavages were necessary to crystallize the difference between 
the two camps, largely because many of the pre-existing cleavages were cross-cutting. That 
is, a very similar language, or the same religion could be associated to more than one identity 
camp. The actual difference between the Serb and the Montenegrin language, particular prior 
to the standardisation of the latter in 2009, was merely denominative. Equally, whether an 
individual would affiliate with the SPC or the CPC was a matter of political, rather than a 
religious choice. Hence, in cases of cross-cutting cleavages, people’s perception of their own 
identity will malleable in that it is likely that it will be associated with their political or 
economic interests. In such cases, the activities of political elites have a pivotal role in 
determining individuals’ ascription to identity camps by reinforcing the cross-cutting 
cleavage by an overlapping one. In the case of Montenegro, this explains the cases of those 
people who felt Montenegrin and voted for independence, but associated with SPC and spoke 
Serbian; or to those people, for example, who felt Serbian, associated with SPC and spoke 
Serbian, but voted for Montenegrin independence. Hence, in Montenegro, the overlapping 
cleavages dominated over the cross-cutting ones as the determinant of the individuals’ 
political choice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Studying political parties and political systems of different countries in the world assumes an 
awareness of those moments in history in which social conflicts were frozen and transferred 
onto the political plane. The role of political elites in freezing conflicts and thus in 
establishing, changing, or perpetuating cleavages has only recently become a prominent 
research topic among political scientists (Enyedi 2005; Deegan-Krausse 2006; Chhibber and 
Torcal 1997), and this is largely due to the rise of new democracies in Europe. Looking at 
how political parties emerged in the post-communist world, Zielinski (2002: 185) noted that 
the degree of the politicization of cleavages is largely dependent on the activities of political 
elites, who may opt for instituting a particular type of cleavage as the core of political 
competition.  
 Against this background, this paper contextualised and analysed the multifaceted and 
complex factors that have given rise to cleavages in the recent contest over statehood and 
identity in Montenegro. It argued that in polities in transition, in which the processes of state 
and nation building are unfinished or unconsolidated, cleavages related to ethnic identity 
become salient in political competition. As such, cleavages become axes around which the 
political parties, which usually represent different ethno-cultural groups, compete for power.  
Moreover, looking in more detail at the case of Montenegro, this paper also showed that 
memories of historical divisions, particular those related to structural cleavages (religion, 
language, culture), are recreated as catalyst of modern political struggles.  
First, the study identified the critical junctures in the divide over statehood and 
identity in Montenegro, thus looking at those moments in recent history in which conflict was 
frozen and transformed into cleavages. The paper looked at four crucial moments, and 
maintained that the 1989 ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolutions and the 2000 fall of Milošević gave 
rise to structural (ethno-cultural) cleavages, while the 1997 split of the DPS and 2006 
Montenegro’s independence generated predominantly functional (class, operational) 
cleavages. The paper also outlined the difference in the nature and intensity of the cleavages 
that emerged at different points in Montenegro’s transition, and in the context of the division 
over statehood and identity particular attention was paid to the post-1997 cleavages. In fact, 
the crack within the DPS in 1997 initiated a series of political struggles that progressively 
resulted in the establishment of two political blocs by 2006: pro-independence and pro-union. 
However, as no society functions as an isolated system, the shaping of people’s identity and 
the divide into pro-independence Montenegrins and unionist Serbs that followed was a 
product of a larger process. This process entailed the interaction among elites, society and 
exogenous influences, such as the fall Milošević in 2000, which triggered the reinvention of 
agendas of political elites and prompted the rise of further ethno-cultural cleavages. The 
cumulative effect of the various cleavages helped the transition of Đukanović’s camp from 
anti-Milošević to pro-independence and of the opposition camp from pro-Milošević to 
unionist. Montenegrin and Serbian identities, respectively, became cemented into these two 
camps. 
Second, the paper looked at the different ethno-cultural narratives that were used to 
underpin the emergence of structural cleavages and their prevalence over functional ones. 
This susceptibility of cleavages to political agency was gained prominence after the demise 
of the regime in Belgrade, when the focus of the elite competition shifted towards the debate 
over statehood and identity. In that respect, past events provided enough reference for the 
Montenegrin leadership to find examples of historical justification for their claims related to 
either: a) independent Montenegrin statehood and separate Montenegrin identity; or to b) the 
unification with Serbia and the indistinctiveness between Serbs and Montenegrins. The fact 
that the two competing camps selectively endorsed these narratives reinforced their 
arguments and made their claims ‘difficult to challenge, even to disbelieve’ (Sinfield 1992: 
33).  
This transfer of historical memory has particular significance for societies undergoing 
a process of transformation after the fall of the socialist rule. Old stories needed to be revived 
to justify social change. The memory of the previous (living) generations dated back largely 
to the period of the socialist rule. Thus, historical narratives of the dynastic rule, heroism and 
glory gained salience in shaping people’s identity because they transcended the period 
remembered by the (living) generations. The competing elites in Montenegro placed 
emphasis on these stories through their discourse, use of symbols, and erection of 
monuments. In the polarised environment, two competing pervasive streams of collective 
memory were revived in order to increase the appeal of the claims of the competing camps. 
The difference between these streams was not merely the selection of facts surrounding 
historical events. Rather, it was the interpretation of the facts that was used to justify the 
contemporary political claims.  
The study concludes by arguing that different types of cleavage had different types of 
impact on the political competition in Montenegro. Using Montenegro as a case-study, this 
research noted that the number of identity camps depends on the type of cleavages 
(independent, overlapping, cross-cutting) in the polity. The more independent (unrelated to 
other cleavages) cleavages there are, the more identity camps will gain salience in the 
struggle for power; the more overlapping cleavages there are, the more likely they will 
coagulate around one political representation of identity. Yet, if the cleavages are cross-
cutting (that is – cutting across several groups), then people’s perception of their own identity 
will be malleable. In such cases, the activities of political elites have a pivotal role in 
determining individuals’ ascription to identity camps, as indicated in the case of Montenegro. 
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Table 1. Polarisation of Montenegrin political life in April 2001vii 
 
Party/Coalition Affiliation % 
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro MNE 7.9 
Serbian Radical Party ‘Dr Vojislav Šešelj’ YUG 1.2 
Liberal Democratic Party MNE 0.1 
Party of Democratic Prosperity – Osman Redža MNE 0.4 
Democratic Alliance of Montenegro MNE 1.0 
Bosniak-Muslim Coalition in Montenegro MNE 1.1 
Party protecting the savings and social security of 
citizens 
N/A 0.05 
Together for Yugoslavia YUG 40.8 
People’s Unity for Montenegro – Dr Novak 
Kilibarda 
MNE 0.1 
Democratic Union of Albanians MNE 1.2 
Yugoslav left in Montenegro YUG 0.05 
Party protecting the savings in foreign currency N/A 0.2 
‘Victory is Montenegro’ – Milo Đukanović MNE 42.4 
Communist and Workers’ Parties – for Yugoslavia 
and self-management 
YUG 0.5 
Party of the Law of Nature N/A 0.1 
People’s Socialist Party – Momir Bulatović YUG 2.9 
 Summary 
 For independence 54.14 
 For Yugoslavia 45.49 
 Neutral 0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Polarisation of Montenegrin political life in May 1998viii 
 
Party/Coalition Affiliation % 
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro AM 6.3 
Serbian Radical Party ‘Dr Vojislav Šešelj’ PM 1.2 
For Serbdom PM 0.4 
Serbian People’s Radical Party in Montenegro PM 0.2 
Yugoslav United Left in Montenegro PM 0.1 
Democratic Alliance in Montenegro AM 1.6 
Bosniak-Muslim List in Montenegro AM 0.1 
Party of the Law of Nature N/A 0.2 
Socialist People’s Party – Momir Bulatović PM 36.1 
Serbian People’s Party PM 1.9 
Party protecting the savings in foreign currency N/A 0.1 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia – Communists 
of Montenegro 
PM 0.5 
‘For a Better Life’ – Milo Đukanović AM 49.5 
Party of Citizens having savings in foreign currency N/A 0.1 
Party of Democratic Action in Montenegro AM 0.6 
Democratic Union of Albanians AM 1.0 
Party of Human Ways N/A 0.1 
 Summary 
 Pro - Milošević 40.45 
 Anti - Milošević 59.14 
 Neutral 0.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
i All factions are rounded to the first decimal.  
ii Negative transition: stability to instability 
iii See section 2.2. 
iv The 1999 Kosovo war did not feature as a critical juncture in Montenegro, because it did not cause any major 
political shifts. Rather, the handling of the Kosovo war by Đukanović’s camp was a part of the policy of 
creeping independence’. For the pro-Milošević camp, the conflict reaffirmed the existing political beliefs based 
on the close links with Serbia. 
v Identity in Slovenia articulated itself through both linguistic and religious particularities; the one in Croatia had 
religion as a clear marker of identity from the identities with which it shared the same language; the one in 
Macedonia had language to differentiate it from identities with which it shared the same religion; and the case of 
the three conflicting identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved the importance of the religious cleavage in the 
process of identity reconstruction after the break-up of Yugoslavia.   
vi Party cleavages that existed in Montenegro’s history did not reproduce themselves during the divide (see 
Morrison 2009). Rather, the narrative of the divide between Greens and Whites, opposing and supporting the 
unconditional unification of Montenegro with Serbia in 1918, became entrenched in the narratives that helped to 
establish the identities of the pro-independence and unionist camps.  
vii Table constructed in line with data from: Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju, Official results: Parliamentary 
Elections, 22 April 2001. Web. At: http://www.cdtmn.org/dokumenti/zvanicni-rezultati-parlamentarni-izbori-
2001.pdf [accessed: 25 June 2011] 
viii Table constructed by this author with data from: Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju, Official results: 
Parliamentary Elections, 31 May 1998. Web. At: http://www.cdtmn.org/dokumenti/zvanicni-rezultati-
parlamentarni-izbori-1998.pdf [accessed: 25 June 2011] 
